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Essay 
Kelo and the Constitutional Revolution that Wasn’t 
BETHANY BERGER 
Wesley Horton and Brendon Levesque are right that public outrage 
over Kelo has overshadowed the real facts of the New London plan, and 
that the decision only affirmed well-established precedent. But while the 
facts were on New London’s side, those facts were harder to translate to 
the public sympathy than the story of the white, female plaintiffs effectively 
publicized by the Institute for Justice in the case. Kelo is also not Dred 
Scott in even more ways than Horton and Levesque state. Unlike Scott v. 
Sandford, Kelo preserved the rights of individuals to challenge taking of 
their homes and receive compensation for the same. For lead plaintiff 
Susette Kelo, this right to compensation resulted in a pay-out of about four 
times the value of her little pink house. And while Scott v. Sandford helped 
trigger a constitutional revolution, Kelo remains good law, and the state 
legal response to it is more show than substance.   
Although I agree with the authors on the big picture, I suggest caution 
on their proposal for curbing eminent domain abuse. The scrutiny for 
pretext they propose was established well before Kelo, but some of the 
factors they suggest would discourage public-private partnerships that 
may more effectively achieve public goals. While judges must police 
governments for bias and favoritism, having inexpert judges make 
decisions that are better left to planning experts and the public process will 
not achieve this end. 
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Kelo and the Constitutional Revolution that Wasn’t 
BETHANY BERGER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am delighted to have the chance to comment on Wesley Horton and 
Brendon Levesque’s excellent article. I agree with them that the facts of 
the Fort Trumbull plan have gotten lost in the public reaction to the case, 
and that Kelo only affirmed well-established law. I also wholeheartedly 
agree that focus on economic development takings may divert attention 
from the real problems of eminent domain abuse. As the authors write, “the 
bigger picture is condemnation in general, and private economic 
development is only a part of it.”1 Here, I emphasize a few things not 
discussed in their article, and sound a word of caution about their proposed 
solution. 
First, although facts matter, so does selling those facts to the public. 
Although the facts here favored New London, many things—from the 
appeal of individual plaintiffs over governments to the race and gender of 
these specific plaintiffs—made it far easier for the public to be swayed by 
the plaintiffs.   
Second, Kelo was not Dred Scott in even more ways than the authors 
state. By eleven years after the Court’s decision in Scott v. Sandford,2 it 
had catalyzed a revolution in American history and had been decisively 
abrogated by constitutional amendment. The decision itself denigrated all 
individual rights of African Americans and the power of Congress to 
protect them. Kelo v. New London,3 in contrast, is still good constitutional 
law, the significance of the state response to it has been exaggerated, and 
the case itself is fading from the public imagination. More importantly, the 
decision leaves property owners with substantial rights (leading to a 
$442,000 payout for Susette Kelo4), while the reverse would have left 
impoverished cities with fewer means to compete with wealthier suburbs, 
and placed the burden of eminent domain on those with the least power to 
                                                                                                                          
* Wallace Stevens Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.  
1 Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 
1427 (2016). 
2 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
3 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
4 George Lefcoe, Jeff Benedict’s Little Pink House: The Back Story of the Kelo Case, 42 CONN. 
L. REV. 925, 954–55 (2010) (reviewing Jeff Benedict’s account of the events leading up to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kelo). 
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fight it.      
Third, I point out some dangers in the authors’ proposal for closer 
scrutiny for pretext. I agree that courts should scrutinize takings to 
determine if they are a mere pretext for benefiting a private party, but this 
was clear before the Kelo decision. And while most of the factors the 
authors suggest are useful in this inquiry, some will undermine the benefits 
of public-private partnerships in development, and contribute to clumsy 
attempts by the judiciary to second-guess land planners. Thus, I worry that 
the specifics of their proposal may encourage courts to play a role for 
which they are not qualified, and may cause more harm than benefit for 
social welfare.  
That said, I also want to particularly thank Wes Horton for his work on 
this case and his generosity in sharing his insights regarding it. Far from 
being Dred Scott, the Kelo case is part of his long and distinguished history 
of using the law to protect individual rights and the public interest.   
II. FACTS MATTER—BUT SO DOES SELLING THEM TO THE PUBLIC 
As Horton and Levesque write, facts matter, and most of them 
supported New London. When the city proposed the plan, New London 
was suffering.5 Divided into small, individually-owned parcels, it needed 
land assembly to develop anything new.6 Fort Trumbull, meanwhile, was a 
derelict, post-industrial brownfield. The U.S. Navy’s sound lab, which had 
occupied a third of Fort Trumbull’s 90 acres, abandoned the site in 1996.7 
What was left included a junkyard, a railroad stockyard, oil storage 
terminals, and car repair businesses.8 Fort Trumbull also housed a regional 
sewage treatment plant.9 The plant had never been capped, and it smelled.10 
The area had worn-out electrical and sewer services, few sidewalks, and no 
public access to the Thames River.11 The redevelopment, in contrast, 
would build on the city’s unique maritime history, a history that has 
                                                                                                                          
5 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473. 
6 See Bethany Berger, Wesley Horton, Thomas J. Londregan & Clark Neily, Selected 
Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Thomas R. Gallivan Jr. Conference—Kelo: A Decade Later, 47 
CONN. L. REV. 1433, 1437 (2015) [hereinafter Kelo—A Decade Later] (remarks of Thomas 
Londregan). 
7 Id. at 1438.  
8 Id. at 1439.  
9 Id. at 1438. 
10 Id.; ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON & THE LIMITS OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 15 (2015) (noting that the sewage plant “periodically emitted a terrible odor that 
annoyed many residents”). 
11 See Kelo—A Decade Later, supra note 6, at 1439 (describing the infrastructure needs of the 
Fort Trumbull area prior to the taking).  
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recently created an economic and cultural “renaissance” in New London.12 
Few people wanted to be in Fort Trumbull in the late 1990s. Eighty 
percent of commercial properties were vacant, as were twenty percent of 
residential properties.13 Eighty-eight percent of the structures were in poor 
to fair condition, with only twelve percent in average condition.14 Susette 
Kelo’s house—next to that smelly sewage treatment plant—had been 
vacant for years until she purchased it in 1997, on the eve of the 
redevelopment plan.15 The vast majority of the Fort Trumbull 
landowners—owning 100 of 115 parcels in the redevelopment plan—sold 
to the city without complaint.16 The nine holdouts owned only .76 
acres17—less than one percent of the redevelopment area.   
So these nine individuals were standing in the way of a development 
that would help a troubled city remediate a brownfield and escape an 
economic crisis. They were protesting government use of eminent domain 
that, as Horton and Levesque write, the Supreme Court had approved for 
fifty years, and likely longer.18 Both facts and precedent were on New 
London’s side. But although New London won the legal battle (albeit by a 
narrow 5-4 margin), it completely lost the public relations war. If facts 
matter, why did that happen?   
One reason is that the New London lawyers were only fighting the 
legal fight, but the plaintiffs’ lawyers were fighting a media war from the 
beginning. The Institute for Justice, which represented the plaintiffs, 
considers the public narrative before it even takes a case.19 Their attorneys 
came armed with press releases and staged public protests with their 
plaintiffs. A search of Lexis and Westlaw’s newspaper databases between 
1998 and 2001 reveals no articles on the Fort Trumbull fight before the 
                                                                                                                          
12 Ellen Albanese, New London’s Renaissance, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 9, 2014), http://www.boston 
globe.com/lifestyle/travel/2014/08/09/new-london-renaissance/hQgGW62PzAewAgpzsB1wMJ/story. 
html [https://perma.cc/UUX8-GPYF].  
13 Kelo—A Decade Later, supra note 6, at 1440. 
14 Id. For a good summary of facts supporting each sides’ perspectives on the case, see Lefcoe, 
supra note 4. 
15 The Kelo House (1890), HISTORIC BUILDINGS OF CONN. (Mar. 20, 2009), http://historicbuilding 
sct.com/?p=1550 [https://perma.cc/DG5Z-M4PK].  
16 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 474–75 (2005) (stating that area contained 115 
parcels and the plaintiff owned fifteen).  
17 Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1410.  
18 Id. at 1414–18; see also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 229–30 (1984) 
(upholding an act permitting the condemnation and transfer of a lessor’s property to the lessee for just 
compensation); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 26 (1954) (upholding a congressional act allowing the 
government to condemn property in D.C. for redevelopment); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining 
Co., 200 U.S. 527, 527 (1906) (affirming the use of eminent domain to permit a mining company to run 
transportation lines over private property). 
19 See Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 931 (“[W]hen Chip Mellor founded IJ [Institute for Justice] in 
1991, ‘he developed a simple formula for selecting cases: (1) sympathetic clients; (2) outrageous facts; 
and (3) evil villains.’”) (citation omitted). 
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Institute got involved,20 and several praising Pfizer, Connecticut College 
President Claire Gaudani, and the New London Development Corporation 
for revitalizing New London and rescuing a decrepit brownfield.21 As soon 
as the Institute for Justice filed suit, however, the stories about the bravery 
of the plaintiffs and the villainy of Pfizer, Gaudani, and the NLDC began.22 
The case proved the maxim that “[c]ommunication is now central to 
management of modern litigation.”23 
But even had New London’s attorneys armed themselves for the media 
war, they would likely have lost. Narratives about governments trying to 
do things to help people collectively are always less immediate than those 
about the individuals themselves. Everyone could see themselves in the 
homeowner plaintiffs. It was harder to see themselves in New London.  
And distinctive facts about these plaintiffs made them particularly 
resonant. The Institute for Justice made sure to highlight these. The 
lawyers broke alphabetic order and placed Susette Kelo—with her little 
pink house, fiery red hair, and quote-worthy conviction—first in the list of 
nine plaintiffs. The gender of the two most prominent plaintiffs, Kelo and 
Wilhemina Dery, may have been significant as well. Women have often 
provided the public face of property rights protests24 and may well be more 
                                                                                                                          
20 The Hartford Courant had only one article about opposition to takings connected with the 
Pfizer plant, but that was about widening a road outside Fort Trumbull to lead to the plant. Charles 
Stannard, Deadline Nears in Race to Save Historic Houses, HARTFORD COURANT (May 26, 2000), 
http://articles.courant.com/2000-05-26/news/0005260702_1_development-plan-howard-street-road-
improvements [https://perma.cc/3Q2Y-U3BQ]. 
21 See, e.g., Jon G. Auerbach, Pfizer Revives Connecticut ‘Brownfield’: Research Campus to Be 
Built on Contaminated Urban Site, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1998, at A2 (“Drug giant Pfizer Inc. is giving 
depressed New London, Conn., a shot in the arm.”); Tom Condon, My Kind of Town: New London 
Prized its Streets, its Characters and Sense of Humor. Progress Almost Ruined it, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Aug. 2, 1998), http://articles.courant.com/1998-08-02/news/9808110145_1_pequot-avenue-
pool-hall-arcade [https://perma.cc/M65J-SGC4] (“New London hit the municipal jackpot. Pfizer Inc. 
announced it would build a $150 million research campus on a vacant stretch of waterfront a mile from 
downtown . . . .”); Michele Jacklin, Cranes Are Everywhere in New London, HARTFORD COURANT 
(Sept. 22, 1999), http://articles.courant.com/1999-09-22/news/9909220547_1_cranes-pfizer-connecti 
cut-college [https://perma.cc/6AW4-ASXU] (“Clearly, both Connecticut College . . . and Pfizer are 
acutely aware that the vitality and strength of their institutions largely depend on the vitality and 
strength of the city they reside in.”). 
22 Carrie Budoff, A Battle Against Eminent Domain: Gritty Dispute in New London, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Jan. 1, 2001), http://articles.courant.com/2001-01-01/news/0101010379_1_susette-kelo-
fort-trumbull-battle-against-eminent-domain [https://perma.cc/H2Y6-ZQSB] (quoting Gaudiani as 
referring to the houses at issue as “‘slum’ houses”). 
23 JAMES F. HAGGERTY, IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION: WINNING YOUR CASE WITH PUBLIC 
RELATIONS xxii (2003). 
24 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394–96 (1994) (establishing new restrictions 
on exactions; female plaintiff); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439, 
441 (1982) (establishing new per se rule for physical invasions; female plaintiff); Richard Roesler, 
Voters Consider Property Measures; Washington, Idaho Initiatives Modeled After Oregon Law, 
SPOKESMAN REV., Oct. 8, 2006, at A1 (describing role of “poster grandma” Dorothy English in 
securing passage of Oregon ballot initiative requiring compensation for regulatory restrictions); Laura 
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compelling as the hapless defenders of the hearth against a grasping state.   
All of the plaintiffs shared some characteristics that made them 
especially easy to sell to the media and public. First, they were all white, 
unlike the inner city owners who are more often the victims of urban 
renewal efforts.25 Their houses, moreover, were single-family detached 
buildings on the beach, so they looked like places where suburban and 
rural voters could imagine themselves.26 The plaintiffs were tailor-made to 
appeal to a wide swath of Americans. 
Contrast the reaction to the bulldozing a few years ago of a 
predominantly African American neighborhood in a historic district in 
New Orleans to make room for parking and commercial space around a 
new privatized Medical Center.27 While there were only a few holdouts in 
Fort Trumbull, in New Orleans the state had to use its eminent domain 
power to acquire 42% of the properties.28 Nevertheless, the media and 
public attention was nothing like what greeted the Fort Trumbull dispute. 
In fact, while the project was pending, Louisiana voters approved a partial 
loosening of its post-Kelo restrictions on eminent domain.29 The Institute 
for Justice, significantly, did not get involved. 
In short, the facts may have favored New London, but the photos and 
sound bites favored the plaintiffs. The result was a widespread outrage 
that, by the summer of 2005, had critics comparing Kelo v. New London to 
Scott v. Sandford.30 Nevertheless . . . 
                                                                                                                          
Oppenheimer, The Monday Profile: The Man Behind Measure 37: David Hunnicutt: Populist Lawyer 
Reigns in Aftermath of Land Use Reversal, OREGONIAN, Dec. 20, 2004, at A1 (stating that property 
rights activist was kidded about the effect of “Hunnicutt’s widows” as public faces of property fights). 
25 Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of 
Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3, 6 (2003) (arguing that “blight” was invented to target 
these communities, which were its primary targets). 
26 Cf. Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the 21st 
Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 895, 909 (2006) (attributing public reaction to fact that suburban 
property owners of inner ring suburbs are now experiencing eminent domain).  
27 Roberta Brandes Gratz, Why Was New Orleans’s Charity Hospital Allowed to Die?, THE 
NATION (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/why-was-new-orleanss-charity-hospital-
allowed-die/ [https://perma.cc/X2V2-FSAP]; Christopher Tidmore, Historic Black Neighborhood to Be 
Sacrificed in New Orleans, L.A. SENTINEL (Dec. 11, 2008), https://lasentinel.net/historic-black-
neighborhood-to-be-sacrificed-in-new-orleans.html [https://perma.cc/6KNW-BPYG].  
28 Jared E. Munster, They Took My Bedroom: A Case Study of Eminent Domain in New Orleans 
228 (Dec. 15, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Orleans).  
29 See John Lovett, Tragedy or Triumph in Post-Katrina New Orleans? Reflections on Possession, 
Dispossession, Demographic Change, and Affordable Housing, 23 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY. 
DEV. L. 289, 291 (2015). 
30 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See Gwen Moritz, An Eminently Debatable Issue: Lawyers Digest 
Practical Applications of Supreme Court’s Kelo Ruling, HIGHBEAM RES.: ARK. BUS. (Aug. 1, 2005), 
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-135247755.html [https://perma.cc/322F-UJJ5] (“Few rulings by 
the U.S. Supreme Court are so momentous that their names enter the public conscience. Kelo v. New 
London seems to have the potential to join Roe v. Wade, Miranda, Dred Scott and Brown v. Board of 
Education.”); Mike Allen & Charles Babington, House Votes to Undercut High Court on Property; 
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III. KELO IS REALLY, REALLY NOT DRED SCOTT 
Despite the comparisons, Kelo v. New London is not Dred Scott in 
even more ways than Horton and Levesque discuss. It is now eleven years 
since the Supreme Court decided Kelo v. New London, and five years since 
the late Justice Scalia (after comparing the decision to Dred Scott) 
declared, “I do not think that the Kelo opinion is long for this world.”31 By 
this time in the history of Scott v. Sandford,32 the decision set the terms of 
the 1860 presidential election, contributing to Abraham Lincoln’s 
victory.33 It was part of the propaganda leading to the Civil War in 1862.34 
And by 1868, the nation had deliberately abrogated the decision in the first 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35 
Kelo has had little impact on the law in comparison. It is still valid on 
the federal level. Even the state response has been exaggerated. Some cite 
the forty-seven states that enacted laws responding to Kelo to indicate just 
how wrong Kelo was,36 and even Horton and Levesque call the state 
response “overwhelming.”37 Scholars who have studied the content of 
these laws, however, generally conclude that most of them did not 
meaningfully restrict eminent domain.38 One pair of property rights 
attorneys even declares that for most of these statutes, “the facade of 
reform is empty, and citizens are no better off than they were on the day 
Kelo was decided.”39 
Kelo is also fading from the American political imagination. When I 
                                                                                                                          
Federal Funds Tied to Eminent Domain, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at A1 (quoting House 
Representative James Sensenbrenner as saying decision “has the potential of becoming the Dred Scott 
decision of the 21st century.”).  
31 Debora Cassens Weiss, Scalia Lumps Kelo Decision with Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade, ABA J. 
(Oct. 19, 2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_lumps_kelo_decision_with_ 
dred_scott_and_roe_v._wade/ [https://perma.cc/F79U-Y56R]. 
32 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
33 See The Political Quadrille. Music by Dred Scott, LIBR. OF CONGRESS PRINTS & 
PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION (1860), https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2008661605/ [https://perma.cc/ 
CEF9-2WFV] (depicting Dred Scott playing the music to which the candidates dance in the 1860 
presidential race).  
34 Austin Allen, An Exaggerated Legacy: Dred Scott and Substantive Due Process, in THE DRED 
SCOTT CASE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND LAW 92 (David Thomas 
Konig, Paul Finkelman, & Christopher Alan Bracey eds., 2010).  
35 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside.”). 
36 See Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J. F. 82, 89 (2015), http:// 
www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/looking-back-ten-years-after-kelo [https://perma.cc/E6MA-8TQQ].  
37 Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1420.  
38 SOMIN, supra note 10, at 141–42 (2015); Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey 
of State and Federal Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 703 
(2011). 
39 Nicholas M. Gieseler & Steven Geoffrey Gieseler, Strict Scrutiny and Eminent Domain After 
Kelo, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 191, 210 (2010). 
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speak to students entering law school, some have heard of the decision, 
some haven’t, and none have the kind of visceral reaction that was almost 
universal several years ago. Donald Trump, moreover, became the 
Republican presidential nominee even though, as Newsweek reminded 
voters in July 2015, he was behind an egregious taking for economic 
development.40 In the 1990s, at the request of Trump’s Atlantic City 
casino, the city authorized the bulldozing of several homes and businesses 
to create parking and open space around the Trump Casino Hotel.41 In 
contrast to the facts Horton and Levesque bring out regarding the New 
London plan, the private party (the Trump casino) was clear from the get 
go, and there were almost no restrictions on how the casino could use the 
land.42 Well before Kelo, the New Jersey courts struck down this blatant 
giveaway to a private entity.43 Yet Trump has garnered the most votes in 
the Republican primary, running in part on a campaign decrying 
government abuse of the little guy.   
Of course Kelo still has some political impact. In 2015, when I 
organized a conference on the aftermath of Kelo, at least one city planner 
said it would be too politically risky for her to participate. Connecticut 
urban development lawyers tell me that cities are now much more reluctant 
to use eminent domain for economic development. The result is that some 
developments don’t happen, and those that do happen more slowly and 
expensively than they would have otherwise. But this fading memory is far 
from the political revolution that reversed Dred Scott.  
Perhaps the most important difference between Scott v. Sandford and 
Kelo v. New London is what the decisions mean for the least well off in our 
society. Scott held that an African-American could never be a citizen, 
could not invoke federal jurisdiction to seek his freedom, and that 
Congress could not even limit the states in which slavery was allowed.44 
Those whose properties are taken by eminent domain, in contrast, have a 
constitutional right to compensation, as well as substantial procedural 
rights to have those takings scrutinized. In this case, Susette Kelo was able 
to translate her resistance into a $442,000 payoff for a house that she had 
paid $53,000 for in 1997, and that was appraised at $100,000 in 2000.45 
More important, a different result in Kelo would have 
                                                                                                                          
40 Daniel Bier, Remember When Trump Tried to Bulldoze a Widow’s Home to Make a Parking 
Lot for Limos?, NEWSWEEK (July 21, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/remember-when-
trump-tried-bulldoze-widows-home-make-parking-lot-limos-355932 [https://perma.cc/4X9W-LX83]. 
41 Id. 
42 Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 106 (N.J. Super. 1998) (invalidating 
taking); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (declaring condemnations 
invalid if they are “for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party”). 
43 Banin, 727 A.2d at 110 (holding that taking would serve a private, not public, function). 
44 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406, 432 (1857). 
45 Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 954–55.  
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disproportionately hurt those who already have the least power in our 
society. Land assembly for economic development in cities is necessary 
precisely to help troubled cities, like New London, deserted by white flight 
to the suburbs and jobs overseas, and trying to provide employment and 
services for the people left behind. The dissenters in Kelo suggested that 
such municipalities could only take properties that were themselves 
blighted,46 and a number of states responded to Kelo by limiting economic 
development takings to blighted properties.47 “Blight,” however, is more 
likely to be found for properties whose owners are poor and non-white. 
One scholar even argues that the concept of “blight” was invented to target 
communities of color in eminent domain projects.48 Limiting eminent 
domain to blight means reserving it for those who already have less 
political clout to fight it.49 The decision in Kelo, in contrast, means that 
cities can try to create economic development to help those who cannot 
flee to the suburbs, and need not target their worst-off residents in doing 
so.   
IV. THE LIMITING PROPOSAL: SCRUTINY FOR PRETEXT  
Finally, after convincingly arguing that Kelo is really not Dred Scott, 
and perhaps to show that they are not any more in favor of eminent domain 
abuse than the Institute for Justice, the authors propose a test to create 
greater scrutiny of eminent domain actions.50 They argue that courts should 
“look more carefully at all condemnations with Justice Kennedy’s eye to 
see whether they qualify as a public use,” and name a number of factors 
they think should be included in this inquiry.51 I agree with the authors that 
takings should be scrutinized for pretext. I am not sure, however, that the 
scrutiny they propose is either useful or necessary.  
At the outset, Kelo was not the case that “for the first time . . . 
                                                                                                                          
46 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498–501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (arguing 
that a property must be designated as blighted before it can be acquired by eminent domain for private 
use).  
47 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 24-2-2, 24-3-2 (2016); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030 (West 
2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 6A.22 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271 (West 2016); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 32.03(6) (West 2015); Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 
464 (N.J. 2007) (invalidating a designation of a property for eminent domain taking solely because it 
was “in need of development”); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1145–46 (Ohio 2006) 
(“[W]e hold that government does not have the authority to appropriate private property based on mere 
belief, supposition, or speculation that the property may pose such a threat [to the public health, safety, 
or general welfare] in the future.”). 
48 Pritchett, supra note 25, at 3 (arguing that “blight” was invented to target these communities). 
49 David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor After Kelo, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 365, 379–80 (2007). 
50 Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1426. 
51 Id.   
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mentioned the possibility of voiding a pretextual taking.”52 Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff53 did this expressly, noting that Hawaii 
agreed that “the Constitution forbids even a compensated taking of 
property when executed for no reason other than to confer a private benefit 
on a particular private party” and that “[a] purely private taking could not 
withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement.”54 Indeed, the much 
maligned Poletown case, in which the Michigan Supreme Court upheld 
condemnations so that General Motors could build a factory in Detroit, 
agreed that “[w]here, as here, the condemnation power is exercised in a 
way that benefits specific and identifiable private interests, a court inspects 
with heightened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the 
predominant interest being advanced.”55 
So scrutiny for pretext is not new or controversial. Potentially more 
troublesome are the factors the authors propose. It should be noted that 
these are all simply “factors” and the authors would not require 
invalidation of a condemnation because one or the other factor is lacking. 
In fact, the authors specifically reject bright-line tests, noting that “[b]right 
lines are easy to apply, but are apt to permit some bad things and prohibit 
some good things.”56 What follows, therefore, is less a critique of the 
authors than a word of caution for courts and legislatures applying such 
scrutiny in the future.  
First, some of the factors may discourage public-private partnerships in 
creating economic development. Factor one is “[w]ill a public body own or 
operate the property?”57 While the public should be concerned about 
privatization of essentially public functions, it is also clear that private 
entities are simply better at many of the operations that lead to economic 
development. As I ask my students, would you rather go to a mall operated 
by the government or one operated by a private entity? How about a 
government versus private cafeteria? As the Supreme Court said in Berman 
v. Parker,58 “[t]he public end may be as well or better served through an 
agency of private enterprise than through a department of government—or 
so the Congress might conclude.”59 Legislative power to decide whether 
private ownership will best serve public interest should not be chilled by 
the search for pretext.   
Similarly, the authors cite as a factor “[w]ere any private beneficiaries 
                                                                                                                          
52 Id. at 1427. 
53 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
54 Id. at 245. 
55 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459–60 (Mich. 1981).  
56 Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1427.  
57 Id. at 1426.  
58 348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954). 
59 Id. 
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known at the time of the vote to condemn?”60 Again, it may well be that a 
project has a better chance of success if a private beneficiary has already 
committed to participate in the project. I agree lack of development in Fort 
Trumbull today is primarily due to the long delay and bad press caused by 
the litigation, as well as the fact that it placed the project on a collision 
course with the 2008 recession.61 But another issue may have been that no 
private developer was identified before the vote to condemn occurred. 
Thus the plans were completed and the properties slated for destruction 
before any private entity had put its money on the line committing to them. 
Might bringing a private developer in early on have led to a better plan, 
and a greater commitment to see the project through to completion?   
In other places, the authors endorse more scrutiny as to whether the 
project will succeed, and whether the condemnation is necessary to 
accomplish the purpose.62 By asserting that this test should apply to all 
takings, not just those where private entities will use the property, and that 
it might have prevented the creation of “road or a bridge to nowhere,” the 
authors seem to be advocating a general judicial scrutiny of whether a 
government plan is in fact a good idea.63 This kind of inquiry was 
specifically rejected in Kelo, Midkiff, and Berman,64 and for good reason. 
It’s not that legislatures are necessarily good planners. Indeed, they are 
often bad planners—and sometimes really, really bad planners—of roads 
and public housing projects, just as of economic development projects. But 
because judges are even worse planners, judicial oversight will not lead to 
better results, nor will it effectively root out pretext. It will simply subject 
what is best decided by experts subject to public opinion and scrutiny to 
the distorting lens of adversarial litigation. 
In the end, while I reject aspects of the authors’ proposal I agree with 
them on the bigger picture. Despite its abuses, eminent domain is 
                                                                                                                          
60 Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1427. 
61 Kelo—A Decade Later, supra note 6, at 1455 (Londregan remarks).  
62 Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1426 (noting also that factor three asks, “[i]s it reasonably 
possible the stated use will actually succeed”; and that factor eight asks, “[is] the particular property in 
question on the periphery of the project?”, and whether there were early statements that a 
condemnation would be approved if it had “a reasonable chance to succeed.”).   
63 Id.  
64 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487–88 (2005) (“Alternatively, petitioners 
maintain that for takings of this kind we should require a ‘reasonable certainty’ that the expected public 
health benefits will actually accrue. Such a rule, however, would represent an even greater departure 
from our precedent.”); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984) (“When the 
legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical 
debates over the wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of 
socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (“We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not 
desirable . . . It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be 
beautiful as well as healthy. . . .”).  
 
 2016] KELO AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 1441 
necessary to achieve the public interest, and bright line restrictions will 
often undermine goals of public welfare and fairness. The best the law can 
do is try to give governments the power to act for the public interest 
without unduly favoring the powerful or burdening the vulnerable. Kelo, 
by allowing troubled cities to try to bolster their economies through 
comprehensive planning, struck the right balance here. 
 
 
